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IX. Environmental Law
Introduction
Nicholas A. Robinson*
Despite the vast mountain ranges, rivers, parks, coasts and
forests within the bounds of its jurisdiction, the Second Circuit
has had little occasion to decide many cases in the area of environmental law.' Nonetheless, sufficient decisions do exist to indicate tentative outlines of the Second Circuit's disposition tov:ai-d
such cases. On balance, the Second Circuit. has carefully and
conservatively hewed to the mandate of Congress in its construction of statutes, has mediated t.he competing demands of developand has cautiously supment and environmental pr~tect~ion,
ported conservationists while sharply criticizing some of their taetics in administrative proceedings. This characterization can be
traced from the early cases of nearly a decade ago through the
several decisions which construed t.he Nat.iona1 Environmental
Policy Act of 196g2[hereinafter referred to as NEPA], including
the two cases treated in this issue of the Second Circuit Review.
The national reputation of the Second Circuit among conservation lawyers was established in Scenic Hudson Preserv~tion
Conference v. $'PC3 In that case, the court, with Judge Hays
writing for a unanimous panel, held that Federal Power Commission licensing of an electrical generating plant on Storm King
Mountain violated requirements of t,he Federal Power Act,' by
failing to consider the fact that
[tlhe Storm King project is to be located in an area of unique
beauty and major historical significance. The highlands and
gorge of the Hudson offer one of the finest pieces of river scenery
in the world. The great German traveller Baedeker called it
"finer than the Rhine."5
A.B., Brown University; .J.D., Columbia University; Member of the Met-: h r k Bar.
hleml)er, Legal Advisory Committee to President's Council on Envimnm~ntnlQuality
(1970-72).
.See, e.g.. Curnulatii~rLht of Reportcd Judicial Dccisions Inr~lringthe il'otictnol
fi~~~irotzrncntal
Wlicy Act of 1969, 10'2 h l o ~ r r ont~5-23 (1973). The District uf Columbia
Circuit reported thirteen NEPA decisions; the Fourth nnd Fifth Circuits ten each; the
Second, Ninth and Tenth Circuits five each; the First nnd Seventh Circuits fciur each;
the Third Circuit three; and the Sixth and Eighth Circuits two each.
' $2 U.S.C. 99 4321-47 (1970).
a 3% F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 19651, cert. denicd, 384 U.S. 911 (19S6).
16 U.S.C. 99 791(a)-828(c)(1970).
:LM F.2d at 613.
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Having found the Federal Power Commission in violation of
Congress' mandate, the court ruled that the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, then an unincorporated association, was an
"aggrieved party" entitled to defend its special interest. The decision presaged the holding in Sierra Club v. Morton8 on the issue
of standing.
Citizens Committee v. Volpe7further evidenced the Circuit's
adherence to the literal language of the controlling statute, along
with its liberal view toward the issue of standing in environmental suits. Again for a unanimous panel, comprised of Circuit
Judge Kaufman and District Judge Ryan, the court, with Senior
Circuit Judge Moore writing the opinion, affirmed the district
court's order voiding a permit issued to the Army Corps of Engineers. The permit approved construction of a dike or causeway
for the then-proposed Hudson River Expressway. The court found
that Congress alone could approve such construction on a navigable river.8In addition, standing was held to have been established
under the "aggrieved" person provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.g "The public interest in environmental res o u r c e ~ , "together
~~
with the plaintiffs' demonstrated " 'special
interest in' the preservation of the natural resources of the Hudson Valley,"" satisfied the elements of standing.
With the adoption of the NEPA, the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970,12 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
amendments of 1972,13Congress vastly expanded the mandates
for environmental protection. The two cases hereinafter discussed involve NEPA in particular; the Clean Air Act and Water
Quality amendments remain, for the most part, untested.14
The NEPA decisions were led off by another round of Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC. l v u d g e Hays, writing
for himself and then-Chief Judge Friendly, ruled that the FPC
had complied with applicable federal law. The court noted that
405 U.S. 727, 738 n.13 (1972).
425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. $8 401 et se9. (1970).
5 U.S.C. 9 702 (1970).
In 425 F.2d at 105.
" Id. at 103.
42 U.S.C. 99 1857 et seq. (1970).
" 33 U.S.C. $1 115-75 (1970).
The most famous Clean Air Act case is really one of non-decision. See Fri v. Sierrn
Clut~,412 U.S. 541 (1973), based on a decision of the United S t a t e District Court of the
District of' Columbia; Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
" 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971). cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
;
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the "functional elements of the project remain the same"IGand
reviewed the extent to which the FPC had complied on remand
with the Federal Power Act. The court held that this review also
satisfied section 102 of NEPA. In concluding, Judge Hays stated
that:
We do not consider that the five years of additional investigation which followed our remand were spent in vain. The petitioners performed a valuable service in that earlier case, and
later before the Commission. By reason of their efforts the Commission has reevaluated the entire Cornwall project. The modifications in the project reflect a heightened awareness of the
conflict between utilit.arian and aesthetic needs. Whether the
project as it now stands represents a perfect balance of these
needs is not for this court to decide. Since the Commission has
fully performed the duties and responsibilities imp~sedupon it,
it is our obligation to deny the petitions in all respect^.'^

In dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Oakes noted that
the FPC had inadequately evaluated the dangers of t,he project
to New York City's Catskill Aqueduct and its polluting effect on
the City's air.18
The division of the panel in the second Scenic Hudson ruling
reappeared in Judge Medina's concurring opinion in hfonrse
County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe.'Wealing with a federally funded state highway surrounding the city of Rochester,
the court held that the Department of Transportation had not
complied with NEPA and ot.her statutes. The court reversed and
remanded to the dist.rict court.. Judge Medina wrote:
I concur, but with some reluctance. I am reluctant because
I think one unfortunate result of our decision in this case rill
be a further delay of four or five years that could easily have
been avoided. And this delay will cause great hardship to the
people of Rochester who have already waited too long for the
completion of this Outer Loop around the city. What bothers me
is that a study of this record makes it fairly certain that after
all the i's have been dotted and all the t's crossed, the final
construction will be substantially the same as the one now proposed and rejected by us.
On the other hand, I am persuaded that some state and
-

l6

I'
l1

-

Id. at 465.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 434-85.
472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972).
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federal highway officials are inclined to look down on conservntionists and environmentalists as trouble makers. The only way
to change this attitude is to require full and strict compliance
with applicable valid statutes and administrative regulations.
That there has been no such compliance here is clearly established in my brother Anderson's well reasoned and persuasive
~pinion.~"

In Hanly v . Mitchell,2' which preceded Hanly o.
K l e i n d i e n ~ tJudge
, ~ ~ Feinberg, with Judges Waterman and Hays
rounding out the panel, dealt with the application of NEPA to the
location of a jail in an urban setting. The court required the
agency to consider whether the proposed federal action was major
or minor, and, derivatively, whether or not it required review. The
latter Hanly case, discussed hereinafter, reinforced the stipulation that the agency conduct a thorough review, even in a preliminary decision as to whether a NEPA impact review is needed, The
consistent posture of the court has been to require close adherence
to the statute's purposes and language.
There is an apparent dichotomy in these cases: on the one
hand, the court has enforced the public policy of environmental
protection and respected the environmental plaintiffs as private
attorneys general; on the other hand, the court has rejected further administrative review which would delay rather than deny
development. This ambivalence also appeared in Greene County
u. FPC.= In that case, the court, with then-Judge Kaufman writing the opinion, invalidated FPC regulations for non-compliance
with NEPA. The regulations did not provide for an inquiry into
environmental impact, independent of the applicant's inquiry.
The court, accordingly, voided an FPC license for a high-voltage
transmission line, but refused to void two other high voltage lines
approved on April 10, 1970, without compliance with NEPA.
Construction of the lines was far advanced and petitioners were
not timely in raising objections. The court noted that:
Although we might arrive a t a different conclusion if there
were significant potential for subversion of the substantive policies expressed in NEPA, . . . the Commission did require
PASNY [Power Authority of the State of N.Y.,applicant] in
submitting its plans to 'give appropriate consideration to recogId. at 703.
460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409

U.S.990 (1972).

" 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 412 U.S.908 (1973).
= 465 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972).
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nized guidelines for protecting the environment' and also conducted its o m independent investigation of alternative routing~.~'
In Greene County, the court refused to grant the plaintiffs
expenses or reasonable attorneys' fees, although it was clear to
the court
that a refusal to award petitioners expenses as they are incurred,
particularly expenses related to production of expert. witnesses,
may significantly hamper a petitioner's efforts to represent the
public interest before the Commis~ion.~
The court claimed that no statute authorized the fees and declined to award costs and fees under the court's equity powers.
The issue of costs and attorneys' fees have progressed dong
the same line as the issue of ~tanding.~"environmental plaintiffs
are to defend the public interest. effectively, they mill require
more than liberal standing doctrines. The court in Greene County
did not reject the equity award; rather it did "not find compelling
need for it a t this point . . . ."= The Second Circuit" pp~siti~n
on this issue thus remains uncharted.
The pattern emerging from t,heserulings shows cautious reliance on the governing statute and a grateful recognition of the
conservationists' public dedication in bringing governmental
bodies to task for ignoring environmental laws, tempered (1)by
a preference for t.he completion of beneficial developments, such
as electrical energy or needed roadways and (2) by holding conservationists at arm's length, perhaps, for fear of stirring them to
excessive action. The latter fear is groundless, in light of the
relatively few environmental cases both nat.ionally and in the
Second Circuit.=
The court in Hun@ v. Kleindiensta grappled with the necess-

='Id. at $25 (citations omitted).
Id. at $26.
For recent developments permitting attornep.' fees in envimnmcntal mrs, sce
1iol)inson. ('r~urtAlcnrded Counsel Fees in EnrironmentaI Litigation, I & 11. 169 N.Y.L.J.
Nos. 16 6: 39 at 1. col. 1 (1973); Robinson. Enrimnmental Litigutian: Trcnd F a ~ ~ r s
Alrnrdirlg ('c~unselFees, 170 N.Y.L.J. No. $9 at 1, col. 1 (1973).
" 455 F:2d at $27.
As indicated by the statistics in note 1supra, envimnrnentalists have not Rosdcd
the rr>iirtswith litigation. Their cases, like those in the civil rights field, have bccn
rarefi~llychosen and professionally prosecuted. In all but n hnndful of cnviranmental
suits. the plaintitFs have prevailed. Bemuse environmental cases tauch upon vastly ditFcrent topics. courts of general jurisdiction nre most appropriate for the rcvie:.~of cnviraninental administrative decisions.
471 F2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). ct-rt. denied. 412 U.S. 908 (19731.
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ity of an environmental impact evaluation under NEPA in the
gray area between "major" projects which require review and
"minor" projects which do not. Again, the Second Circuit experienced difficulty in compromising between environmental protection and development, as pointed out by Judge Mansfield's majority opinion and Judge Friendly's dissent.
In Port of New York Authority v. United state^,^" the court
declined to require a NEPA evaluation for proposed tariffs licensed to the Perm Control by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The court found i t impossible to entertain "the careful balancing analysis mandated by NEPA,"" in that the inevitable
choice between development and environmental protection was
not presented to them. Rather, the issue was the environmental
effect of a tariff change for freight barge lighterage service in New
York Harbor.
The court declined to weigh environmental impact a t the
early stage of tariff approval; instead, it required the complainant
to raise these issues directly before the ICC, noting that
[olne might argue that a simple solution to the problem caused
by the constraint of time is to require the Commission to preserve the status quo pending the preparation of an environmental impact statement. In the instant case this would mean staying Penn Central's proposed tariffs. But such a solution is too
simple. It overlooks the fact that preserving the status quo can
be as determental to the environment as permitting changes in
the status quo. Just as cities can argue that increases in tariffs
cause the diversion of traffic to trucks, thereby increasing air
pollution, so railroads can argue that losses incurred on one line
must be made up on another either in the form of increased
tariffs or decreased quality of service, which in turn discourage
the use of this other line, thereby diverting traffic to trucks (or,
in the case of passenger lines, to automobiles), which diversion
in turn causes an increase in air pollution."
Port of New York Authority, therefore, can be read to require
a thorough evaluation of environmental impact by the administrative agency. Court review was not undertaken on the theory
that it was premature, just as eleventh-hour reviews were dismissed as tardy in Greene County. Such judicial reasoning is not
compatible with Hanly, which required that the agency itself
" 451 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.

1971).

Id. at 790.
== Id.
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decide whether NEPA review was warranted.
More recently, in United States v. American Csanamid
Co.," Chief Judge Kaufman succinctly restated what may be
considered the Circuit's straight.fonvard attitude toward implementing the congressional mandate for environmental protection.
The ruling upheld a district. court. finding that the defendant had
violated the Refuse Act of 1899. Judge Kaufman, writing for s
panel comprised of Circuit Judge Smith and District Judge
Bryan, stated:
The interpretation which appellant urges upon this Court
is precisely the type of "cramped" reading that the Supreme
Court has cautioned against. . . . Semantic gymnastics must
not be allowed to undermine a Congressional purpose to preserve the purity of our watenvays. Conservation of our once
formidable natural resources is a matter of profound national
concern. Congress has acted to accommodate the diverse, often
conflicting, needs of our highly industrialized society through
legislation, such as the Refuse Act. of 1899. Moreover, in arriving
at our conclusion we are not. unmindful of Learned HanCs eloquent guide to statutory construction, that we must "remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest
guide to their meaning."g'
At present, it remains uncertain whether the Second Circuit
requires strict adherence to NEPA, as Hanly and the dissent sf
Judge Oakes in Scenic Hudson might indicate; or tvhether the
court has read into the environmental laws certain exemptions,
as illustrated in Judge Hays' second Scenic Hudson ruling, Judge
Moore's decision in Port of Neur York Authority, or Judge Medina7s concurring opinion in Monroe County. Certainly, it is not
the court's role to make normative decisions in favor of either
rivers or roads, power lines or mountains. No means exist to simplify the process of weighing competing public policies.
It is apparent from Judge Anderson's decision in hfonroe
County that environmental protection is a consideration which
must be addressed prior to the approval of any new development.
"Congress has mandated that all federal lens shall be interpreted
in accordance with t.he policies set forth in NEPA."= NEPA cer480 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1135 (citations omitted).
" 472 F.2d at 700. "In other words, a rand must not take parkland, u n l ~ as prudent
person, concerned with the quality of the humon environment, i s mnvinced that there &,
no way to avoid doing so." Id.
a
a'
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tainly does not discourage environmental impact review; yet the
tendency to find exemptions persists where projects are near completion or the agency deems its act not a "major federal action."
The Second Circuit, which confronted the issue of whether a jail
was "major," has not decided whether a nuclear research reactor
is
How the Second Circuit will resolve its ambivalence toward
environmental cases is unclear. Chief Judge Kaufman's ruling in
American Cyanamid offers the most attractive lead, a t once compatible with the Hanly rulings and the dissents of Judges
Friendly and Oakes. Requirements of environmental protection
are too far advanced, both legally and scientifically, to excuse
inadequate administrative compliance with NEPA, the Refuse
Act, the Clean Air Act, or other laws. Since most agencies, as
their primary task, regulate economic development, the bias in
favor of that priority often supplants the new interest in environmental protection. NEPA was intended to eliminate that bias,
and unless the courts rule as the Second Circuit did in Hanly and
Monroe County, that intent will not be served.
See the ruling in Morningside Renewal Council v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 19731,
in which Judge Hays, writing for himself and Judge Mulligan, refused to reverse an AEC
decision that the license for operation of Columbia University's TRIGA MARK 11 nuclear
research reactor was not a major federal action, citing the Hanly jail cases as support
t herefir. Judge Oakes wrote an exhaustive dissent, also relying on the Hanly c n s s . Judgo
Oakes observed that "by upholding the AEC's determination that there would not bo any
such significant potential effect here [requiring NEPA review], the majority apparently
adopted the "rational basis" standard of review rejected by the Hanly court. 471 F.2d a t
829. The effect of the majority's decision is to provide the agencies with a loopholo by
which to render NEPA meaningless.
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